George Soros: By failing to help refugees Europe fails itself

By failing to help refugees Europe fails itself
By: George Soros
Financial Times
July 27, 2015

As many as 400,000 people will make dangerous journeys to reach Europe this year, about half of them fleeing the civil war in Syria or brutal government repression in Eritrea. By the time they reach the west, they will have had to risk their lives twice: once in fleeing their countries, and again in entering ours.

The victims of many previous conflicts have had better luck. After the 1956 Soviet invasion, 200,000 Hungarians fled to Austria and Yugoslavia; within months almost all had been resettled in countries as far flung as the US, Australia, Brazil and Tunisia. A generation later, when war scattered millions in Indochina, the international community resettled 1.3m. In the 1990s, the Balkan conflicts displaced almost 4m people, and again the world helped.

But in the present refugee crisis the EU has failed to act collectively, leading countries to take matters into their own hands. Hungary is building a fence along its border with Serbia. Frontline states are shirking their obligations under the European asylum system, for instance by failing to provide adequate reception and asylum processing capacity, thus encouraging them to move elsewhere in the EU. France and Austria have temporarily reinstated passport controls at borders.

After the Refugee Convention was adopted in 1951, Europe served for decades as its moral and operational backbone. No longer. In May, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive agenda on migration that, if implemented, would give Europeans what they seek — a sense of control over migration flows. In most EU countries, citizens view legal migration positively; it is the chaos at their borders that sends them into the arms of populists.

Yet only two aspects of the commission’s agenda received immediate support: a military mission targeting smugglers in the Mediterranean, which launched last month, and a robust effort to return migrants who are found not to qualify for international protection. The rest of the plan, which aimed to save lives and create livelihoods for those unable to go home, came under attack.

The most resisted idea was a mandatory plan to take 40,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to be processed in other member states. In the end, only 32,000 were accepted on a voluntary basis. The impact on most of those countries would be minimal — and they, too, are likely to be beneficiaries of the relocation principle when migration flows shift. A proposal to resettle 20,000 refugees from camps in the Middle East also proved unattainable.

These programmes embody the spirit of shared responsibility that lies at the heart of the EU. If they do not become permanent and mandatory features of the common European asylum system, it will fall apart. If improved, however, the European asylum system could serve as a model for international co-operation on refugee protection.

Europe must make it possible for refugees to apply for asylum in safety. This does not mean offering protection to everyone in need. But those whom Europe does accept should not be forced to risk their lives. In practice, this would entail allowing people to apply for asylum from abroad. Thousands of Syrian refugees with skills needed in Europe — doctors, nurses, construction workers — languish unemployed in Lebanese and Jordanian camps. The EU could allow them to apply for labour visas.

As it pursues one integrated migration and asylum policy, the EU should eliminate the waste and redundancy of 28 parallel systems. There should be a single European asylum and migration agency, for example, that processes asylum applications for the entire union. Eventually, a joint border guard should be established, too.

The EU’s migration system must be remade to reflect a more collective and generous spirit — and one that is more faithful to European values.

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George Soros

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Europe Should Rescue Banks Before States

Europe should rescue banks before states
George Soros
Published: December 15, 2010 Financial Times

The architects of the euro knew that it was incomplete when they designed it. The currency had a common central bank but no common treasury - unavoidable given that the Maastricht treaty was meant to bring about monetary union without political union. The authorities were confident, however, that if and when the euro ran into a crisis they would be able to overcome it. After all, that is how the European Union was created, taking one step at a time, knowing full well that additional steps would be required.

With hindsight, however, one can identify other deficiencies in the euro of which its architects were unaware. A currency supposed to bring convergence has produced divergences instead. That is because the founders did not realise that imbalances may emerge not only in the public sphere but also in the private sector.

After the euro came into force, commercial banks could refinance their holdings of government bonds at the discount window of the European Central Bank and regulators treated such bonds as riskless. This caused interest rate differentials between various countries to shrink. This in turn generated property booms in the weaker economies, reducing their competitiveness. At the same time Germany, suffering from the after- effects of reunification, had to tighten its belt. Trade unions agreed to make concessions on wages and working conditions in exchange for job security. That is how the divergences emerged. Yet the banks continued to load up on the government bonds of the weaker countries in order to benefit from the minuscule interest rate differentials that still remained.

That lack of a common treasury first became apparent as a problem after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on October 15 2008, when the threat of a systemic collapse forced governments to guarantee that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail. At that time Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, insisted that each country should guarantee its own institutions, rejecting a Europe-wide approach. Interestingly, interest rate differentials widened only in 2009 when the newly elected Greek government announced that its predecessor had cheated and the deficit was much larger than reported. That was the start of the euro crisis.

The lack of a common treasury is now being remedied: first came the Greek rescue package, then a temporary emergency facility. The financial authorities are a little bit pregnant and it is virtually certain that some permanent institution will be set up. Unfortunately, it is equally certain that the new arrangements will also be flawed. For the euro suffers from other shortcomings. Policymakers are confronted not only by a currency crisis but also by a banking crisis and a crisis in macroeconomic theory.

The authorities are making at least two mistakes. One is that they are determined to avoid defaults or haircuts on currently outstanding sovereign debt for fear of provoking a banking crisis. The bondholders of insolvent banks are being protected at the expense of taxpayers. This is politically unacceptable. A new Irish government to be elected next spring is bound to repudiate the current arrangements. Markets recognise this and that is why the Irish rescue brought no relief. Second, high interest rates charged on rescue packages make it impossible for the weaker countries to improve their competitiveness vis-a-vis the stronger ones. Divergences will continue to widen and weaker countries will continue to weaken. Mutual resentment between creditors and debtors is liable to grow and there is a real danger that the euro may destroy the political and social cohesion of the EU.

Both mistakes can be corrected. With regard to the first, emergency funds ought to be used to recapitalise banking systems as well as to provide loans to sovereign states. The former would be a more efficient use of funds than the latter. It would leave countries with smaller deficits, and they could regain access to the market sooner if the banking system were properly capitalised. It is better to inject equity now rather than later and it is better to do it on a Europe-wide basis than each country acting on its own. That would create a European regulatory regime. Europe-wide regulation of banks interferes with national sovereignty less than European control over fiscal policy. And European control over banks is less amenable to political abuse than national control.

With regard to the second problem, the interest rate on rescue packages should be reduced to the rate at which the EU itself can borrow. This would have the advantage of developing an active Eurobond market.

These two structural changes may not be sufficient to provide the countries in need of rescue with an escape route. Additional measures, such as haircuts on sovereign debt, may be needed. But having been properly recapitalised, banks could absorb this. In any case, two clearly visible mistakes that condemn the EU to a bleak future would be avoided.
The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC

Lessons Learned from George Soros

The fact that one side is wrong doesn't mean that the other side is right. (George Soros)

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If we were attacked, we have to get back, we call it a war. But the way this war was implemented was actually counter productive. It has made the terrorist threat much bigger. We abhor terrorists because they kill innocent people for political goals. When we chase them down, we really must go out of the way not to do the same thing. Because if we torture people, humiliate people, kill people who are innocent, they will look at us in the same light as we look at terrorists. (George Soros)

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